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SPIRITUAL EQUALITY, THE BLACK CODES AND
THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE FREEDMEN
David F Forte*
I. COLONIZATION
Senator Garett Davis, the gentleman from Kentucky, rose to
offer an amendment to Senate Bill 108:
And be it further enacted, That all persons liberated under this
act shall be colonized out of the limits of the United States; and
the sum of $100,000, out of any money in the Treasury not other-
wise appropriated, shall be expended, under the direction of the
President of the United States, for that purpose.'
There was little doubt that in March of 1862, with the
Southern delegations absent, the Republicans had the votes to
end slavery in the District of Columbia. 2 However, Senator Da-
vis from the slave state of Kentucky had touched a raw nerve. If
slavery did end as a result of the Civil War, what was the coun-
try going to do with the three and one-half million freedmen
that would be let loose? Only two percent of the North was
black. Davis well appreciated the antipathy of many Northern
whites to the idea of having to live with blacks, and the fear of
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
A.B., Harvard; M.A. (Econ.), Manchester University; Ph.D., University of Toronto; J.D.,
Columbia University. I thank Professor James Viator for organizing and hosting the con-
ference for which this article was prepared, the generous hospitality of Dean John
Makdisi, the faculty and staff of Loyola School of Law, and the research assistance pro-
vided by Joseph Rodgers and Terrell Menefee. My visiting colleague, Professor Paul
Finkelman, was generous in seeking to guide me through the historical research he
knows so well and contributed to so extensively. Whatever errors, misinterpretations or
omissions remain are mine alone.
1. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CON-
TEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENT 32 (Alfred
Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES].
2. See HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY MEASURES OF THE THIRTY-
SEVENTH AND THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESSES, 1861-64, at 38-78 (1969). But see Paul
Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum
North, 17 RUrGEs L.J. 415 (1986).
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a mass migration to the North if the war were won. 3 So he
asked the North this tacit question, "If you really want to free
the slaves, but do not want to live with them, can you afford the
enormous costs in shipping them out to Africa, the Caribbean,
or Latin America?"
It was clear to all that the dilemma of many in the North
was how to free the slave, but not have to live with the Negro.
Over the previous century, particularly during the struggle for
independence, the disparate groups of white men that populated
America had begun to form themselves as a "people" with a po-
litical identity. But in doing so, they were forced to confront the
dissonance of a group of human beings within their midst who
were marked with a sign of permanent separateness. Because of
the agitation of the religious abolitionists, slavery had become
more morally unacceptable in the antebellum North, but most
Northerners still had a conceptual difficulty integrating the
black population fully into the "people" who constituted the na-
tion. The abhorrence of legal miscegenation was but one aspect
of this basic political/moral outlook. Even Abraham Lincoln, it is
asserted, harbored deep doubts about whether the freed blacks
could ever be a social part of the nation.4
As the War drew on, the dilemma facing Lincoln was how to
preserve the Union and provide for as much equality for the Ne-
gro as the country and the exigencies of reintegration of the
South would take.5 Meanwhile, the dilemma of the strong aboli-
tionist wing of the Republican Party was how to overcome the
moderates' desire for placating (and reintegrating) the South at
the expense of the equality of the blacks.
The nerve of the whole debate centered on the issue of the
colonization of the Negro - or more appropriately, forced
recolonization. For the moderate opponents of slavery, coloniza-
tion solved the problem of freeing the slave while acknowledging
that he could never be part of the nation or the American citi-
zenry. For those defending slavery, the stupendous cost of
3. HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREED-
MEN'S RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1866, at 13 (1976).
4. See Louis FILLER, CRUSADE AGAINST SLAVERY: FRIENDS, FOES, AND REFORMS, 1830-
1860, at 269 n.22 (1986) (asserting that Lincoln wanted to resettle the freed blacks out
of the country).
5. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 6-7 (Henry S.
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988).
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recolonizing millions of blacks back to Africa or to the Caribbean
should give the North cause to reconsider whether abolition, and
the War itself, would be worth the price of victory. For those
whom the Democrats would later label as "radicals" (and have
that label stick), nothing was more offensive to their idea of
equality than plans for colonization.
The debate over emancipation in the District of Columbia
and in the slave states still in the Union starkly delineated the
divisions over white America's conception of the place of the Ne-
gro. In the spring of 1862, while Senator Davis from Kentucky
was moving to send the emancipated slaves of the District of Co-
lumbia out of the country, over in the House of Representatives,
a Select Committee was about to meet to determine whether col-
onization should follow the emancipation of slaves in the states
of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mis-
souri.6 Three months later, the Select Committee reported that
colonization was a necessity and concluded that "the highest in-
terests of the white race, whether Anglo-Saxon, Celt, or Scandi-
navian, require that the whole country should be held and occu-
pied by those races alone."7
In treating emancipation in the District of Columbia, the
position of many in the Senate was not far from the views of the
House Select Committee. Senator Doolittle from Wisconsin
declared:
I would extend freedom to the colored man. I go further: the free-
dom I would give him should be more than a thing in name; it
should be a thing in substance, freedom in fact. Two things are
necessary to give him that. He must be free not only from the
control of a single master; he must be free from the presence and
domination of a stronger race.8
There are three views on the question of slavery, Senator
Doolittle declared. John C. Calhoun regarded slavery as a bless-
ing;9 John Brown wished to root it out entirely;10 and Thomas
Jefferson wished to end slavery, but knew that the two races
6. H.R. Rep. No. 148, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1862), reprinted in THE REcON-
STRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 30.
7. Id.
8. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1862) (Statement of Sen. Doolittle), re-
printed in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 32.
9. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 33.
10. Id.
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could not live in harmony side by side." Doolittle said that he
would embrace Jefferson's compromise. 12 The Senator stopped
short, however, of urging that the freed slaves be expelled. 13 He
believed the inducements of becoming the superior class in Haiti
or Liberia, with the protection of the United States, would be in-
centive enough. 14 Doolittle amended Senator Davis's proposal:
have Congress appropriate the money for colonization, but let
each freedman of the District of Columbia decide for himself
whether to go. 15 Senator Doolittle's "compromise" outraged the
radicals in the Senate and the House. Samuel Pomeroy from
Kansas exclaimed, "I have noticed that persons who have some
constitutional objections or difficulties in regard to having free
colored men about them, never have any very severe difficulties
to having slaves about them."16 Senator James Wilson of Iowa
upbraided Senator Davis for insulting the industry of the free
blacks in the District and their capacity to be self-sufficient
members of society.
17
To the radical abolitionists, freeing the slave and then cast-
ing him off was no freedom at all.'8 But in 1862, the radicals
were outnumbered. Even the moderate Lyman Trumbull from
Illinois backed the compromise; 19 and in the end, emancipation
and funds for voluntary colonization were packaged together.
20
President Lincoln signed the bill and sent a message approving
both the emancipation and the colonization provisions. 21 The
battle over the emancipation of slaves in the District was a mi-
crocosm of what the political struggle over freed slaves in the
nation would become. By the fall of 1862, it was accepted
throughout the Republican North that the Civil War was being
11. Id. at 32.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 32.
15. Id. at 33.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 34.
18. BELZ, supra note 3, at 13.
19. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 35. The Doolittle-
Davis Amendment initially failed to obtain a majority, but Doolittle revived it and it
passed with a strong majority. WILSON, supra note 2, at 48, 63.
20. Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376-78 (providing for the release of certain
persons held to Service or Labor in the District of Columbia). The law also provided for
compensation for slave owners in the District. Id.
21. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 38.
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fought to end slavery as well as to preserve the Union.22 That is
why the issue of colonization was of central importance. What
was the country going to do with a massive population of poor,
landless, and illiterate people?
A month later, when proposals for a national program of re-
colonization were aired in the Senate, Senator John Hale of New
Hampshire explained that the entire tonnage of the United
States Navy could not carry off the annual increase in the black
population, let alone reduce their numbers.23 Frederick Douglass
and other black leaders had explained to President Lincoln that
the freedmen did not want to leave.24 "This is our country as
much as it is yours, and we will not leave it," Douglass told Lin-
coln.25 Northern blacks resolutely opposed the idea: "Here we
were born, and here we will die."26 In any event, as John Hale
had reminded the Senate, it was a physical impossibility to
make the slaves leave. One way or another, the problem of slav-
ery and its aftermath could not be removed from the United
States. The country was going to have to deal with the Negro.
When Congress forbade slavery in all federal territories a few
months later, it included no financial inducement for
expatriation.27
II. SPIRITUAL EQUALITY
The basic principle animating the radical abolitionist
Republicans was that the black person was the spiritual equal
of the white within the political community.28 Fueled by the
northern Protestant abolitionist credo, these activists sought in-
clusion for the freedman within the American civic community.
Expatriation of the freedman was, by definition, an acknowl-
22. BRUCE LEVINE, HALF SLAVE AND HALF FREE: THE ROOTS OF THE CIVIL WAR 239-
40 (Eric Foner consulting ed., 1992).
23. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 35.
24. CHARLES M. CHRISTIAN, BLACK SAGA: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 189
(1995).
25. Id.
26. Introduction to 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS: THE UNITED STATES, 1830-
1846, at 6 (C. Peter Ripley ed., 1991).
27. Act of June 19, 1862, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432 (providing freedom to all persons
within the territories of the United States). Congress also put into effect the treaty be-
tween Great Britain and the United States for the suppression of the African slave
trade. Act of July 11, 1862, ch. 140, 12 stat. 531 (providing for the treaty).
28. John L. Thomas, The Abolitionist Crusade, in SLAVERY ATTACKED: THE ABOLI-
TIONIsT CRUSADE 1 (John L. Thomas ed., 1965).
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edgement of his inherent human and spiritual inequality.29
In the early years of African slavery, justification for the
practice centered on the fact that those who were heathens
could be enslaved. As baptism, therefore, seemed a route by
which a slave might claim his freedom, the Christianization of
the African slave was early on discouraged. By the eighteenth
century, however, African slavery as an institution had become
established, and baptism had no legal effect on the slaves' sta-
tus. 30 Following the first Great Awakening, evangelization of the
slave population began and continued in earnest until the Civil
War. Many slaves were brought into their master's church where
they were taught the Christian duty of obedience. A larger num-
ber, however, joined the evangelical religions, particularly Meth-
odism and Baptism, where they sat as brothers among the
poorer whites of the South.
For their part, the evangelical sects muffled whatever aboli-
tionist message they might have earlier proclaimed as they ex-
tended their influence in the South.31 Only minority sects such
as the Quakers made abolitionism a central feature of their the-
ology and praxis.32 To the extent that they embraced abolition-
ism, most northern Christians seemed sympathetic to the aim of
the American Colonization Society, which sought to repatriate
freed blacks to Africa.33 Significantly, blacks were more at-
tracted to the evangelical sects and the notion of God-given
equality, one that the society could abuse, but never undo.
34
By the early nineteenth century, while most of the Chris-
tian churches had come to some kind of modus vivendi with
slavery, northern Protestantism was undergoing a transforma-
tion. Arminianism had displaced the remaining Calvinist ele-
ments of much of American Protestantism and had swept the
nation during the Second Great Awakening. There were three
29. Id.
30. JOHN B. BoLEs, RACE AND RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1740-1860, at 2-3
(1988).
31. Id. at 4-12.
32. JOHN R. McKIVIGAN, THE WAR AGAINST PROSLAVERY RELIGION: ABOLITIONISM AND
THE NORTHERN CHURCHES, 1830-1865, at 44 (1984).
33. Thomas, supra note 28, at 18-19.
34. See Albert J. Raboteau, Black Christianity in North America, in 1 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: STUDIES OF TRADITIONS AND MOVEMENTS 635,
636-41 (Charles H. Lippy & Peter W. Williams eds., 1988) (chronicling the spread of
evangelism among blacks in the North and South).
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elements of this later stage of Arminianism that bore on the
American character and upon slavery. First, Arminianism
stressed the individual's responsibility in seeking and accepting
the salvific sacrifice of Christ. If a person was not a free moral
agent, he was not in the position to obtain salvation by his own
free will. Second, acceptance of Christ required acknowledge-
ment of one's sins and an immediate reconstitution of one's life
in the way of virtue. Finally, the Spirit moved the saved soul to
exercise benevolence towards all mankind.35 Arminianism, un-
like Calvinism, was righteously optimistic.
A strong strain of societal perfectionism arose out of the
spirit of benevolence among many of its adherents. It came also
from the growing doctrine of postmillenialism, which held that
Christ's second coming would occur after the millennial-perfect
age and not before.6 All major social betterment movements of
the nineteenth century, including radical abolitionism, arose
from these theological doctrines.
The radical abolitionist movement began in the 1820s. A
decade later it had fully matured and spread its doctrines
throughout Northern evangelistic Protestantism. 7 It entered
politics and spawned entities that directly sired the radical abo-
litionist wing of the Republican Party,3 ripening in the midst of
the Second Great Awakening and the unprecedented wave of re-
vivalism that swept the country.39
The man generally regarded as the most responsible for set-
ting off the movement of radical religious abolitionism was Wil-
liam Lloyd Garrison.40 Like his sometime ally, Theodore Weld,
Garrison (though formally a Unitarian) represented the north-
ern wing of dissenting and Arminian evangelistic Protestantism
and held as doctrine the radical equality of men before God,
35. Thomas, supra note 28, at 19-20.
36. Id.
37. The spread of abolitionism from evangelical churches to other Protestant enti-
ties as well as northern Catholicism can be gleaned from EDwARD MAGDOL, THE ANTI-
SLAVERY RANK AND FILE: A SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE ABOLrIONISTS' CONSTITUENCY 91, 127
(1986) (showing tables of religious affiliation of those who signed antislavery petitions).
38. Id. at 3-12. See generally, FILLER, supra note 4, at 258-80.
39. LEvINE. supra note 22, at 81-82; ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL. FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARRY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 109 (1970).
40. See generally JULES ARCHER, ANGRY ABOLITIONIST: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON
(1969); JOHN L THOMAS, THE IABERATOR: WLL.M LLOYD GARRISON (1963).
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each person equally responsible for his own salvation.41 Slavery
was a patent denial of the spiritual equality of the black within
the polity, a denial tellingly confirmed by the Supreme Court's
exclusion of blacks from citizenship in the Dred Scott case and
extended to all of African descent, free or slave.42 Denying equal-
ity was a sin and a judgment upon individuals and the country
alike. Under the theology of the radical abolitionist movement,
no longer would it suffice to save the black man's soul after his
death. Being postmillenialists, the northern Protestants were
impelled by their theology to end slavery immediately. In fact,
northern Protestantism held that slavery endangered not only
the souls of those who owned slaves and tolerated slavery, but
also the slaves themselves. Despite the churching of their slaves,
the slave owners themselves constrained the capacity for salva-
tion of their slaves.43
Until the 1820s, abolitionism was a small movement made
up of individuals and local organizations. Few abolitionists
called for immediate freedom for the slave. Most were wedded to
the idea of gradual emancipation and repatriation of the blacks
to Africa. Representing that program was the most prominent
abolitionist organization of the time, the American Society for
Colonializing the Free People of Color." But that was too soon to
change.
Influenced by his Baptist youth and the Quakerism of his
colleague, Benjamin Lundy, William Lloyd Garrison joined the
abolitionist cause in 1829. 45 He soon broke from mainstream ab-
olitionism, however, and in 1831, spread his passionate message
for immediate abolition through his influential newspaper, The
Liberator.46 A more radical organization, the American Anti-
41. LEvINE, supra note 22, at 81-84.
42. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
43. LEWIS PERRY, RADICAL ABOLITIONISM: ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN
ANTISLAVERY THOUGHT 48 (1973); see also FONER, supra note 39, at 111 (insisting that the
North was to partially bare the sin of the South for the continued existence of slavery);
Donald M. Scott, Abolition as a Sacred Vocation, in ANTISLAVERY RECONSIDERED: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ABOLITIONISTS 51, 69 (Lewis Perry & Michael Feilman eds., 1979)
(explaining that it was the duty of a Christian fastened to a commitment to God to be
firmly fastened to a commitment to abolish slavery).
44. MERTON L. DILLON, THE ABOLITIONISTS: THE GROWTH OF A DISSENTING MINORITY
19-20 (1974); FILLER, supra note 4, at 20-21.
45. WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE 26-27 (1963). See generally id. at
26-39 (describing Garrison's travels with Lundy).
46. See id. at 26-55.
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Slavery Society, soon stole the march of its more hesitant
predecessors.
4 7
By the mid-1830s radical abolitionism had permeated the
North, assaulted the South, caused numerous schisms in the
Protestant establishment, and had itself split into many fac-
tions. Garrison's uncompromising logic soon drove him to con-
demn the entire American political structure and its Constitu-
tion which permitted such an evil as slavery.48 Others, such as
the Tappan brothers, used their philanthropy and influence to
spread the message of abolition to the churches and the public.49
Most importantly, many others thought themselves called to di-
rect political action.50 From these activists, many political move-
ments arose that did not condemn the legitimacy of the polity,
but sought to achieve abolition within the political structure.51
These men influenced the ambivalent Whigs,52 established the
Liberty Party, 3 helped organize the Free Soilers and the Free
Democrats,54 and merged their ideology into the coalition that
became the new Republican Party.55 Nonetheless, all the strands
of the radical abolitionist movement remained committed to its
unpopular Protestant theology, namely that God had created all
men to be equal before Him and that those who failed to oppose
47. VICTOR B. HowARD, RELIGION AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, 1860-
1870, at 1, 7-9, 202 (1990); Thomas, supra note 28, at 2-3. Garrison formed the New En-
gland Anti-Slavery Society, a precursor for hundreds of other local anti-slavery societies.
FILLER, supra note 4, at 80-88. For an account of evangelistic proselytizing of abolition in
the South, see STANLEY HARROLD, THE ABOLITIONISTS AND THE SOUTH, 1831-1861, at 84-
106 (1995).
48. MERRILL, supra note 45, at 204-07; William Lloyd Garrison Repudiates the Gov-
ernment of the United States, in SLAVERY ATTACKED: THE ABOLITIONIST CRUSADE, supra
note 28, at 76-79.
49. See Lawrence J. Friedman, Lewis Tappan's Circle, in THE ABOLITIONISTS:
MEANS, ENDS, MOTIVATIONS 105-55 (Lawrence B. Goodheart & Hugh Hawkins eds., 1995).
50. See id. at 111; MAGDOL, supra note 37, at 41.
51. MAGDOL, supra note 37, at 41.
52. See James B. Stewart, Abolitionists, Insurgents, and Third Parties: Sectional-
ism and Partism Politics in Northern Wiggery, 1836-1844, in CRUSADERS AND COMPROMIS-
ERS: ESSAYS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ANTISLAVERY STRUGGLE TO THE ANTEBELLUM
PARTY SYSTEM 25 (Alan M. Kraut ed., 1983) [hereinafter CRUSADERS AND COMPROMISERS].
53. Alan M. Kraut, Partisanship and Principles: The Liberty Party in Antebellum
Political Culture, in CRUSADERS AND COMPROMISERS, supra note 52, at 71. The Liberty
Party was particularly born of religious fervor. FONER, supra note 39, at 78.
54. Richard H. Sewell, Slavery, Race, and the Free Soil Party, 1848-1854, in CRU-
SADERS AND COMPROMISERS, supra note 52, at 101.
55. Phyllis F. Field, Party Politics and Antislavery Idealism: The Republican Ap-
proach to Racial Change in New York, 1855-1860, in CRUSADERS AND COMPROMISERS,
supra note 52, at 125.
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slavery would be judged by God accordingly.56 Emancipation was
also a moral necessity for the slave, slavery being "the worst of
all moral wrongs because it totally precluded individual opportu-
nity to pursue God's command."57 Slavery placed the bondsman
under the "dominion of spiritual death," said Garrison. 58 It ne-
gated the moral and theological requirement of "Christian free
agency," that is, the necessity for each person individually to
confront God and salvation. 9 Radical abolitionism began and re-
mained until the end of the Civil War, a movement born of, con-
nected to, and sustained by religious principles and fervor.60
Whatever notion of equality between the races that may have
entered the legal debate was distinctly religiously founded.
6'
Few free thinkers of the era, though waxing enthusiastically
about atheism, gave much shrift to abolition.62
For many in the North, sending freed slaves back to Africa,
or the Caribbean, or to a haven in Latin America promised to
satisfy both their conscience and their bias.63 Colonization had
long been one of the main wings of the early "abolitionist" move-
ment (though slave owners supported its program), and it re-
56. See, eg., the extended tract by GEORGE B. CHEEvER, D.D., GOD AGAINST SLAVERY:
AND THE FREEDOM AND DUTY OF THE PULPIT TO REBUKE IT, AS A SIN AGAINST GOD (1969).
As the American Anti-Slavery Society declared in 1833:
[A]ll those laws which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery, are there-
fore before God utterly null and void; being an audacious usurpation of the Divine
prerogative, a daring infringement on the law of nature, a base overthrow of the
very foundations of the social compact, a complete extinction of all the relations,
endearments and obligations of mankind, and a presumptuous transgression of all
the holy commandments ....
American Anti-Slavery Society, Declaration of Sentiments (1833), in THE ABOLITIONISTS:
MEANS, ENDS, AND MOIVATIONS, supra note 49, at 47.
57. LAWRENCE J. FRIEDMAN, GREGARIOUS SAINTS: SELF AND COMMUNITY N AMERICAN
ABOLITONISM, 1830-1870, at 230 (1982).
58. WILLIAM L. GARRISON, THOUGHTS ON AFRICAN COLONIZATION 37 (William L. Katz
ed., 1968).
59. C. Duncan Rice, Controversies over Slavery in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-
Century Scotland, in ANTISLAVERY RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE ABOLITION-
ISTS, supra note 43, at 24, 37.
60. WILLiAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 21-22 (1988).
61. This was so even though many in the movement criticized the antislavery polit-
ical radicals for not giving more explicit acknowledgment to the sinfulness of the institu-
tion. See Friedman, supra note 49, at 230-31 (indicating the rhetorical differences be-
tween the "immediatists" who emphasized individual opportunities to pursue God, and
the "radicals' who emphasized opportunities to improve economic conditions).
62. FILLER, supra note 4, at 40.
63. Id. at 21-22, 37.
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mained a prominent plank in the political program of northern
moderates as well as of southern slavers who saw free blacks as
an incendiary example to their slaves.64 But colonization struck
at the heart of the radical abolitionists' program of emancipa-
tion and civic equality. William Lloyd Garrison's New England
Anti-Slavery Society had as its first enemy the institution of
slavery. But its second enemy was the American Colonization
Society. In fact, in terms of vitriol, colonization was to Garrison
the more damnable position, for it feigned concern for the Negro
while affirming his inferior status as a human being.65 As much
as slavery, banishment denied the spiritual equality of the black
man within the civic community. While some moderate northern
opinion continued to hope in the specious panacea of coloniza-
tion, in the South there was no ambiguity. Slavery, the slave
codes, and the legislation restricting free blacks renounced the
possibility of any sort of equality to the black population.
Antebellum slave codes were an amalgam of legislation con-
straining the behavior of slaves and of those that dealt with
them. Commonly, the law declared that one's free or slave sta-
tus followed that of the mother.66 A Negro's testimony was ille-
gal in any proceeding against whites. 67 Slaves had no right of
contract or property.68 A free Negro could not lift a hand against
a white person except in defense of a wanton assault.6 9 A slave
could not leave the plantation without the owner's permission.70
Blacks could not assemble even in the presence of a white man,
own firearms, be taught to read or write, and were forbidden to
64. Thomas, supra note 28, at 1.
65. MERRILL, supra note 48, at 60-61; William L. Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison
Abandons Colonization, in THoMAs, supra note 28, at 6, 6-10.
66. For analyses of the law of slavery and examples of specific slave codes, see Wil-
liam Goodell, The American Slave Code in THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEA-
TURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS (1968);
THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860 (1996); MARK V.
TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND
INTEREST (1981); STATE SLAVERY STATUTES: GUIDE TO THE MICRO FICHE COLLECTION (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1989); Hans W. Baade, The Gens De Couleur of Louisiana: Comparative
Slave Law in Microcosm, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 535 (1996); Paul Finkelman, "Let Justice
Be Done, Though the Heavens May Fall" The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 325
(1994).
67. Finkelman, supra note 66, at 330.
68. Id. at 332.
69. Id. at 330.
70. Id. at 332.
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transmit or possess inflammatory literature.71 They were pur-
posely denied all legal attributes of being human.
Although the free Negro was restricted by law in the North,
often denied the right to vote, 72 and sometimes segregated on
public conveyances, 73 there was nothing approaching the legal
suppression of slaves and the black freemen in the South. For
its part, however, much of the North denied the possibility of so-
cial equality with the free black.74 A large proportion of men and
women in the North had accepted the Negro's cultural and intel-
lectual inferiority.75 They feared that an exodus of free blacks
from the South would take away employment from white work-
ers.76 Such a prospect also raised the visceral specter of miscege-
nation. Full civic equality for the black population was not ac-
ceptable to these whites in the North if it carried with it a
social and material equality as well.77 In the face of such well-
established social presumptions, the task of the radical aboli-
tionist to gain a level of legal equality for the black, even in the
context of the Civil War, remained daunting.78
M. THE RADICALS
Following the passage of emancipation legislation for the
District of Columbia and the federal territories, the focus of the
place of the black population shifted to reconstruction and the
conflict between the President and the more radical members of
his party in Congress. 79 By deciding how the freedmen were go-
ing to fit into the American community through reconstruction,
Congress and the President were destined to define the Ameri-
can community"0
71. Id. at 330-32.
72. See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 421-22 (illustrating some of the protections
blacks enjoyed in the North). The effect of slavery on the legal status of freemen in the
South is discussed in THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 13-41
(1965).
73. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 416.
74. BELZ, supra note 3, at 142.
75. Id. at 141-42.
76. Id. at 143.
77. See id. at 138-42.
78. Id. at 140.
79. Emc L. McKrriuc, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 67-84 (1960).
80. Id.
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We now know that the image of the radical cabal in Con-
gress was largely constructed by the Democratic opposition in
Congress during 1865 and confirmed by post-Reconstruction his-
torians.81 In fact, the radical abolitionists in Congress never met
as a caucus, never devised a long term strategy, and never
agreed among themselves on all major issues.8 2 A number, like
Sumner and Trumbull, moved between the moderates and the
radicals.83 They were particularly in the minority in the Thirty-
eighth Congress after the Democrats, opting for an anti-war
platform, had made significant gains in the 1862 elections.
84
Even in 1865 after the Democrats took a drubbing in the 1864
elections and fell to below one-third of their pre-war strength,
the radicals had no easy time of it. Most studies that attempt to
identify the radicals disagree on who they were. ss The Radical
majority was not, then, an electoral creation, but a political one,
birthed by Andrew Johnson's reconstruction policy in 1865 and
the shocking impact of the Black Code legislation passed by the
southern states in late 1865 and 1866.86
Virtually all of the radical Republican leaders, however,
were fervent abolitionist Christians, direct disciples of the move-
ment of evangelical abolitionism of the 1820s and 1830s.8 7 They
were "the spokesmen and representatives of the evangelical and
liberal churches" and were "united by their devotion to religion
and their moral commitment."8 Although the radicals and the
"immediatists" differed on the pace of abolition (the radicals
early united around the platform of no extension of slavery
rather than its immediate extermination), the radicals drew
their image of the black man as a member of the polity directly
from the dissenting theology of William Lloyd Garrison and
other religious abolitionist leaders, possessing "a Christian con-
cern for their duties to the freedmen and a commitment to equal
rights."89 Most of the radicals hailed from the areas of New En-
gland or from settlements of New Englanders elsewhere where
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. FoNER, supra note 39, at 104.
84. McKrrmIC, supra note 79, at 44.
85. See FONER, supra note 39, at 103.
86. See McKrrRIcK supra note 79, at 153-74.
87. HowARD, supra note 47, at 1-3.
88. Id. at 3-4.
89. Id. at 4.
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the religious abolitionist crusade was most ardent.90 For exam-
ple, Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Representatives Tha-
deus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Owen Lovejoy of Illinois were
brought into the abolitionist fold by Reverend Theodore Weld,
while Senators Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson of Massachu-
setts admitted the same debt to Garrison. 91 Secretary of the
Treasury Salmon Chase was equally fervent in his devotions
and his abolitionism. 92 Other radicals who saw their mission to
free the Negro as a religious command included Senator Samuel
Pomeroy of Kansas, and Congressmen William Cutler, Joshua R.
Giddings and James Ashley of Ohio, Thomas Williams of Penn-
sylvania, Isaac N. Arnold of Illinois, and George Julian of Indi-
ana.93 John Bingham of Ohio, usually classed as a moderate but
credited with the most expansive interpretation of the rights of
citizens under his view of the Fourteenth Amendment, derived
his view of the equality of the Negro from his religious upbring-
ing, as did Senators James F. Wilson of Iowa and John P. Hale
of New Hampshire.94
Many of the radicals, like Thaddeus Stevens, wanted to
treat the South as conquered territory.95 Southern states, he ar-
gued, had extinguished their own state sovereignty by their
word and their rebellion.96 But it was not the malice of post-war
vindictiveness that unified the R~publicans around a radical
program; it was the treatment of the free blacks by Andrew
Johnson and the southern states. 97 The Republicans in Congress
believed that the twin aims of the Civil War were undermined
first, when the secession's leaders returned to Congress in 1865
(and would soon be bolstered in strength because of the end of
the three-fifths rule in counting blacks), and second, when John-
son and the South had returned the black man to a legal posi-
90. FONER, supra note 39, at 106-10.
91. Id. at 109.
92. HOWARD, supra note 47, at 98.
93. FONER, supra note 39, at 78-79, 110; HOWARD, supra note 47, at 56-57, 75, 237;
JAMES B. STEWART, HOLY WARRIORS: THE ABOLITIONISTS AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 85-86
(Eric Foner ed., 1976).
94. Richard L. Aynes, The Antislavery and Abolitionist Background of John A.
Bingham, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 913 (1988); HOWARD, supra note 47, at 238 n.4; RICH-
ARD H. SEWELL, JoHiN P. HALF AND THE POLrIcs OF ABoLmrION 33-34 (1965).
95. Id.
96. McKrmrcK, supra note 79, at 99.
97. Id.
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tion of quasi-slavery 98 After all the blood and pain, the battles,
the disease, the Anderonsvilles, the crippling wounds, and the
massive slaughter, returning to the status quo ante, even with-
out slavery, was simply unacceptable. 99 If President Johnson had
had more political sense, if he had not acted on his strong per-
sonal antipathy to the Negro, he would have realized his er-
ror.10 Instead, he plunged ahead to battle the Republicans, ulti-
mately engendering the kind of military reconstruction that
would have had no chance of passing Congress when he first
succeeded to the Presidency.10 1
The great legal and constitutional reforms of 1866 - the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment - can-
not be fully understood except in terms of passion - the passion
induced by betrayal. 10 2 The Congressional Republicans believed
Andrew Johnson connived to undo the sacrifice of four years
that had become a crusade against slavery.10 3 There was a politi-
cal betrayal as well. Their party had been cast by the Demo-
crats as the War party, while the Democrats since early 1862
had gambled on taking electoral advantage of Union defeats.
10 4
Johnson was a War Democrat, brought onto the ticket by Lin-
coln in 1864 for his successful formation of a Unionist govern-
ment in Tennessee.1 5 By late 1865 for some and by early 1866
for the rest, the Republicans were convinced that his continuing
affiliation with the Democrats made him a political as well as a
moral traitor to the War effort. His surprise vetoes of the Freed-
men's Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act, and his bitter attack
on the party leaders left the Republicans with no doubt.1°6 They
realized they had a Democrat in the White House, who was put
there by an assassin's bullet.10 7
In all of this passionate conflict, the central issue remained:
What was the country going to do with its African population?
98. HANS L. TREFOUSSE, IMPEACHMENT OF A PRESIDENT: ANDREW JOHNSON, THE
BLACKS, AND RECONSTRUCTION 41-44 (1975).
99. Id at 30-47.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. FONER, supra note 5, at 241-47, 260-61.
103. Id. at 261-71.
104. Id. at 182-83.
105. Id. at 43.
106. FONER, supra note 5, at 247-50.
107. McKITRIcK, supra note 79, at 11-12.
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Throughout the War, there were three obstacles facing the
radical abolitionists, who had remained a disorganized minority
until Andrew Johnson made them a majority. The first was mili-
tary: the Confederate armies and their superb leadership had to
be defeated. 1 8 In this, Lincoln was at one with the radicals as
he desperately kept searching for a general who could fight. He
eventually found two: Grant, who would not be stopped by tac-
tical defeats, 10 9 and Sherman, who would not be stopped by tac-
tical victories." 0
The second obstacle was political: the widespread dislike of
the black man and the presumption of his racial inferiority.
Many representatives of the North could not press the issue be-
yond the tolerance (or intolerance) of their constituents."'
The third obstacle was legal: despite Lincoln's electoral vic-
tory and his call to arms to defend the Union, the Dred Scott de-
cision holding that no son or daughter of Africa could be a citi-
zen of the United States had stuck.112 True, many abolitionists
had asserted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution accorded national citizenship and should, therefore,
accord any free black national citizenship. 1 3 Nonetheless, the
dominant legal opinion held that the most a black man could be
was a citizen of a state that decided to accord him citizenship,
and whatever civil rights he was granted could come only from
his state and the protection that his state chose to give him." 4
For the time being, the radicals had to content themselves
with local victories. Using the District as a model, they per-
suaded Congress to pass laws that allowed blacks the right to
sue and testify in court, 115 and to permit part of the taxes levied
on their property to be set aside for public schools for Negro
108. FONER, supra note 5, at 14-18.
109. Id. at 444-64.
110. BELZ, supra note 3, at 15-34, 150-53.
111. FONER, supra note 5, at 61-67; BELZ, supra note 3, at 138-42.
112. BELZ, supra note 3, at 19-20.
113. Id. at 28-29. For a discussion of the treatment of this doctrine, see JACOBUS
TENBROEK. EQUAL UNDER LAW 94-115 (Collier Books 1965) (1951) (describing the "para-
mount national citizenship" argument of a wing of the abolitionists).
114. BELZ, supra note 3, at 28-29, 53, 145.
115. Act of July 12, 1862, ch. 54 § 1-5, 12 Stat. 538 (a supplementary act to the
"Act for the Release of certain persons held to Service or Labor in the District of
Columbia").
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children. 116 But the real battle was with Lincoln's lenient recon-
struction policy. The activist abolitionists bridled at what they
believed was an executive usurpation of Congressional author-
ity.117 Substantively, they took the South's secession for what it
was. They intended to treat the reconquered South as a federal
territory to be organized as Congress saw fit and, by that reor-
ganization, obtain civil equality for the freed slaves." 8 In both of
these objectives, they regarded Lincoln as their adversary.
For his part, Lincoln believed that the wounds of war and
separation were deep and would be long-lasting unless the rein-
tegration of the South was handled delicately and gently.
1
1
9
Therefore, he replicated the tactic of the Federalists of 1789 who
had reached out to the Anti-Federalists with the Bill of Rights
and firmly integrated them into the new government. Lincoln
hesitated in pressing emancipation so far and so fast as to alien-
ate the slave states still in the Union and to destroy the pros-
pects for an effective reintegration of those that had seceded. 120
As the war progressed, however, and the intractability of the
South was effectively backed by their arms, Lincoln realized
that emancipation not only satisfied his moral objectives, but
also was politically and militarily useful to the North.121
Johnson also had a lenient reconstruction policy, but it is
clear that, unlike Johnson, Lincoln never wished or expected the
country to return to an emancipated status quo ante.122 Lincoln
promised reunion only if certain conditions towards blacks be
accepted, and he indicated that the Union would intervene if the
freed blacks were oppressed. 123 Lincoln, nonetheless, retained
the flexibility that only a master politician could understand.
124
Johnson totally lacked that skill. 125 Abraham Lincoln fully un-
derstood the complexity and fluidity of the political situation of
the South and how it was different in each state as the months
116. Act of May 21, 1862, ch. 83 § 1-4, 12 Stat. 407 (providing for the education of
colored children in the cities of Washington and Georgetown).
117. FoNER, supra note 5, at 61.
118. LEviNE, supra note 22, at 239.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 183.
121. See FoNER, supra note 5, at 5-8.
122. BELZ, supra note 3, at 43.
123. Id.
124. McKrrmcK, supra note 79, at 103-06.
125. Id.
1998] 585
Loyola Law Review
passed.126 His goal was to regain a healthy reintegration with as
much guarantees for the Negro rights as the situation would
permit.127 As such, he purposely eschewed any rigid or theoreti-
cal viewpoint.
128
Johnson gave away all his political weapons as a c6ncession
to the South in 1865, asking almost nothing in advance, and
was forced to beg for the little the South grudgingly agreed to. 29
Lincoln's tactic was more in tune with the Founders, with whom
he felt a passionately close kinship.130 The framers of the Bill of
Rights approved those articles and framed them precisely to
avoid a concession to the Anti-Federalists (who wanted a new
constitutional convention) that would undo the successful strug-
gle at the Philadelphia Convention. Johnson, on the other hand,
was willing to concede to the South nearly everything to have
them back. It was that betrayal, and Johnson's intemperate veto
of congressional legislation designed to protect the freedmen
from renewed Southern oppression, that led to the success of the
Radical program. 131
The gradual movement to recognize the civil equality of
blacks began in 1861, when military commanders in the North
declared escaped slaves as "contraband" and unreturnable, not-
withstanding the Fugitive Slave Act.132 In the Confiscation Act
of 1861, Congress extended the contraband theory and declared
that when slaves were used by the South in aid of the rebellion,
their owners forfeited any right to them as slaves 33 Soon after,
Congress provided for procedures for escaped slaves to be certi-
fied as free, but their status after that remained undefined.' 3
The Confiscation Act of 1862135 went a little further and de-
clared the slaves that escaped into Union lines to be "forever
free," but provided no procedural protections for these persons if
126. Id. at 105-07.
127. Id. at 183.
128. Id. at 106-08.
129. See McKITRICK, supra note 79, at 106-08.
130. See id. at 107-08.
131. For a well-documented discussion of the Radical program, see McKITEICK,
supra note 79, passim.
132. PEYTON McCRARY, ABRAHAm LINCOLN AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE LOUISIANA Ex-
PERIMENT 71 (1978).
133. Confiscation Act, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319 (1861).
134. BELz, supra note 3, at 5.
135. Second Confiscation Act, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
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they were later recaptured. 136 Instead, like the District of Co-
lumbia Emancipation Bill, the Confiscation Act of 1862 actually
offered provisions for voluntary colonization. 137 The primary pur-
pose of these bills, like the Militia Act of 1862 which provided
for the enlistment of blacks into the army, was to deny man-
power to the enemy and to turn their use to the interests of the
North.
138
When Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclama-
tion in September 1862,139 however, the future status of the
freed blacks became central. The Proclamation was, of course,
only a partial emancipation, applying only to the slaves within
the seceded states not under Union occupation. 4° There was a
question of the legal validity of the Proclamation, 4 1 but more
importantly, the partial emancipation did not, as some radical
Republicans had hoped, put an immediate legal end to slavery.
They would soon come to see that the principle of black equality
and black freedom could not be achieved by halves. 142 But in
1862, the radicals were in the minority, and even before Sep-
tember, the most Congress would do was call upon the federal
government to assist those states that "may adopt gradual aboli-
tion of slavery."143
But what was the status of those who were freed, whether
by proclamation, military action, or congressional enactment?
John Bingham believed that the end of slavery would necessa-
rily turn persons of color into citizens. 144 For him, the issue was
emancipation vel non. If people were not property, then they
were citizens. His view, supported by Attorney General Edward
Bates, was that all children, as well as adults, enjoyed national
citizenship."45 In contrast, the received legal view was that na-
136. BELZ, supra note 3, at 10.
137. Id. at 12-13.
138. Id. at 14.
139. Emancipation Proclamation, 1863 app. 17, 12 Stat. 1268-69 (1863).
140. Id.
141. 2 JoHN W. BURGEss, THE CIVIL WAR AND THE CONS'TTUTION 1859-65, at 116-17
(1901, 1971). But see JAMEs M. McPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA
558 (1988).
142. See BELZ, supra note 3, at 38-41.
143. S.J. Res. 26, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 Stat. 617 (1862) (declaring that the
United States ought to afford pecuniary aid to any state adopting the gradual abolish-
ment of slavery).
144. BELZ, supra note 3, at 27, 40.
145. Id. at 26.
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tional citizenship was derivative of state citizenship.146 If one
was not a citizen of a state, one could not be a citizen of the
United States. 147
The radicals did not appreciate Lincoln's flexibility. They
saw it as indecisive or worse to leave the fate of the black man
with the states who had oppressed him, once emancipation was
declared. 14 Yet Lincoln held out the option of federal interven-
tion if the rights of the freedmen were not respected. Although
his exertion of executive power in pursuit of the War at times
exceeded constitutional limits, he saw no need for a constitu-
tional revolution in the structure of the Union.149 The states
would be the vehicles for the end to slavery and would be re-
sponsible for the eventual integration of the freedmen into the
polity.150 Lincoln did believe that requiring the seceded states to
abolish slavery as a price for reunion was necessary - the
Emancipation Proclamation unquestionably required that - but
beyond this he would wait to see how the black man's legal and
political progress would fare within the states.151
The minority radicals had little confidence in incremental-
ism or in the good faith of the states that had for so long de-
fended slavery with every possible exertion.152 And so from 1863
to 1865, they fought for their goal by resisting Lincoln's recon-
struction policy, by passing the Freedmen's Bureau, and by
sending the Thirteenth Amendment to the states. 153 In each of
these battles the radical Republicans believed that their objec-
tive of Negro citizenship was achieved by implication, but they
came to realize that only an explicit affirmation would accom-
plish the goal.
IV. INTERNAL COLONIZATION
Lincoln's relatively generous policy of reconstruction was set
forth in his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction of De-
146. Id. at x.
147. Id. at 26.
148. Id. at 52.
149. BELZ, supra note 3, at 41-43.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 41.
152. Id. at 53.
153. See id. at 51-134.
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cember 1863.154 His Proclamation offered re-entry to the states
of the South if ten percent of the adult white male population
took an oath of loyalty to the Union and abolished slavery.
155
Lincoln's set piece of reconstruction was Louisiana. By executive
order, he established a loyal government led by moderates who,
in early 1864, called a constitutional convention. The convention
abolished slavery, gave blacks access to the courts on the same
basis as whites, provided for public education for white and ne-
gro children, and under pressure from Lincoln, allowed the op-
tion for black suffrage, at least for those who owned property,
had fought for the Union, or were educated. 156 But in the first
session of the newly constituted Louisiana Legislature, the
lawmakers refused to enact even limited black suffrage into
law. 157
Much more troublesome was the Union's treatment of the
freed slaves in Louisiana and the South as a whole. The Union
military authorities in the South approved a plan of apprentice-
ship for the freed black, a policy that Lincoln seemed to accept,
at least as an interim measure "conforming substantially to the
most approved plans of gradual emancipation."158 In Louisiana,
the Union military officer in control, General Nathaniel Banks,
ordered that the freed slaves be encouraged to return to their
former plantations where they were to sign one year contracts
and be bound not to leave their employer.5 9 Michael Hahn, fu-
ture governor, told Louisiana planters that enforcement of the
state's proposed vagrancy laws would guarantee a supply of la-
bor.160 The Union military established a similar system of ap-
prenticeship in the Mississippi valley.1
61
The Union military's attitude towards the freed slaves in its
jurisdiction contrasted with how it regarded the blacks within
the ranks. It was true that the military denied material equality
to the blacks as well as military status: their pay was lower and
they could not rise above the ranks. Yet as soldiers, the Union
154. BELZ, supra note 3, at 42.
155. FoNER, supra note 5, at 35-36.
156. McCRARY, supra note 132, at 237-67.
157. For a thorough treatment of Lincoln's Louisiana experiment, see id.
158. BELZ, supra note 3, at 42 (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 45-46; McCRARY, supra note 132, at 115-20.
160. McCRARY, supra note 132, at 209.
161. BELZ, supra note 3, at 46.
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would not deny them their standing.162 After blacks began fight-
ing for the Union in uniform, the administration resolutely re-
fused exchanges of prisoners that did not equally include the re-
turn of former slaves now fighting in blue.163 The South, of
course, would not recognize that these men were free, and more,
the South could not acknowledge by the prisoner exchange that
these men had the status of citizen-soldier.1 4 The horrors of An-
dersonville and other prisons would not have happened if an
agreement on paroling prisoners had been reached earlier.
65
Thousands of white Union prisoners suffered and died for the
loyalty shown by the Union military to its own black troops. 66
In reaction to Lincoln's reconstruction policy and the Union
"apprenticeship" treatment of the civilian freedmen, Republican
opposition and ideology began to gel, some of it at the behest of
the radicals, and some of it over their objection. 167 For those
Republicans, Lincoln's ten percent provision was far too low. It
was unconscionable that former confederates were allowed such
easy access to power again, that blacks were denied suffrage
even on a limited basis, but most of all, that the freedmen were
reduced to a status that was a kind of serfdom. More than any-
thing, the military policy of enforced apprenticeship struck
many in Congress as a violation of the whole purpose of emanci-
pation. It treated blacks as subjects of the United States and
not as free citizens. 68
Just as a Christian could not be a true Christian and toler-
ate slavery within his church, so too could a nation not truly be
a nation while an entire class was left out of being a citizen.
Baptism brought a slave into the community of the church, but
baptism per se was not enough. Christian baptism in the theol-
ogy of the northern Protestants brought along the spiritual
rights of free agency, and the obligation to strive for postmil-
lenial perfection. Being merely a citizen in name was not
enough. Citizenship also brought along those elements by which
one could be truly a spiritual equal within the polity. The
162. Id. at 33 n.34.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. WILLIAM MARVEL, ANDERSONVILLE: THE LAST DEPO'r 25-26 (Gary W. Gallagher
ed., 1994).
166. Id. at x.
167. BELZ, supra note 3, at 51.
168. Id. at 51-60.
590 [Vol. 43
Spiritual Equality
Republicans were to define the signs of citizenship as free labor
and contract, the enjoyment of judicial privileges, and the right
to own property and enter lawful occupations. 169 In fact, for the
Republicans, the sign of full citizenship was the enjoyment by
the black of the same privileges and immunities for which the
colonists had fought the Revolution. Those rights encompassed
due process, the right to own property, the right of access to the
courts including trial by jury and habeas corpus, the right to en-
gage in any of the common occupations of life, and the right to
contract. 170
The issue of suffrage was more ambiguous. With so many
northern states denying black suffrage, it was hard to argue
that citizenship necessarily required the right to vote. But the
radicals in Congress realized that the absolute denial of suffrage
meant that there was no political protection available to the
freedman in the enjoyment of the attributes of citizdnship. 171
In response to Lincoln's experiment in Louisiana, Senators
Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Henry Winter Davis of Maryland
attempted to devise a reconstruction policy to supplant the Pres-
ident's.172 Congress succeeded in passing the Wade-Davis Recon-
struction Bill on July 2, 1864, but because of the increased num-
bers of Democrats elected in 1862, many of its provisions had to
be watered down. 173 In any event, the Bill never became law be-
cause President Lincoln gave it a pocket veto. 174 The Wade-Davis
Bill would have appointed provisional military governors to the
southern states, and allowed for a constitutional convention of
the state only when a majority of the state's white citizens
swore an oath of loyalty.175 The state constitution had to abolish
slavery, repudiate secession, and disqualify confederate officials
from holding office. Only those who had not voluntarily given
aid to the confederacy would have been allowed to vote. The act
would have extended the protection of habeas corpus to the
freedmen and required that there be no discriminatory
169. Id. at 43; FONER, supra note 39, at 9.
170. MICHAEL K CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BiLL OF RIGHTS 111, 116-17 (1986).
171. FoNEA, supra note 5, at 36, 221-24.
172. BELZ, supra note 3, at 58.
173. Id. at 61.
174. Id. at 62.
175. Id. at 59, 67 n.28.
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legislation.176
Even more important to the Republican image of the status
of the freed slave in the republic than the Wade-Davis Bill was
the act establishing the Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and
Refugees, commonly known as the Freedmen's Bureau.177 Con-
gress struggled lengthily over the legislation. In that struggle,
the Republican sense of the moral position of the freed black be-
gan to crystallize.
178
The initial forms of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill in the
House of Representatives as developed in 1863 and 1864 were
paternalistic and treated blacks as a distinct class of persons re-
quiring separate legislation. 179 As passed by the House in 1864,
the Bill would have established a bureau to superintend all
questions having to do with persons of color, not just freed
slaves, and would have allowed them to occupy and cultivate
abandoned lands in the South.80 Its sponsor, Thomas Eliot of
Massachusetts, argued that these measures were necessary to
prevent the freedmen from being reduced to a condition of serf-
dom. 8' In opposition, the Democrats claimed that the federal
government was assuming a power to regulate the affairs of free
persons, something only the states were empowered to do, un-
less of course, the state government did not agree that the for-
mer slaves were truly free. 8 2
The House Bill was defeated in Senate committee precisely
because it treated blacks as a dependent class and, despite Con-
gressman Eliot's protestations to the contrary, because it
smacked too much of marking the freedmen as quasi-serfs. 18
Undoubtedly, the objections to the military's policy of appren-
ticeship figured in the defeat of the House Bill. Instead, the
Senate version, as developed by Charles Sumner, required that
the freedmen be governed by the notions of free labor and con-
tract and that the Bureau supervise such contracts to make
176. Id. at 59-63. There was no provision for colonization in that bill. Id.
177. See BELZ, supra note 3, at 75-108.
178. The work by Herman Belz most clearly reveals the progressive development of
the Congressional position. See id.
179. Id. at 76-77.
180. Id. at 76.
181. Id. at 77.
182. BELZ, supra note 3, at 77-78.
183. Id. at 80-81.
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sure both parties fulfilled their mutual obligations. 184 To that
end, the Bureau was directed not only to "superintend" the
freedmen, but also to "secure" them in their rights. 185 In re-
sponse to criticisms of Republicans that the Bill still placed the
former slaves in a regime of "peon slavery," Sumner added a
provision providing judicial access to the freedmen and judicial
review of the actions of government agents.'8 Further objections
that the Bill still required that the government act as a "guard-
ian" to free people led to an amendment authorizing the Bureau
to exist only so long as the rebellion continued. 87 In that form,
the measure passed the Senate. However, the House did not
concur, and action was postponed until the December 1864 ses-
sion of the 38th Congress. l88
In 1865, the lame duck session of the 38th Congress pro-
duced a bill similar to what Sumner had reported the previous
year, with more emphasis on blacks being able to occupy and
purchase land, in addition to having the option of becoming con-
tract laborers. 89 Before that bill could be voted on, a substitute
measure swept through the House.190 Responding to criticisms
by men like John P. Hale of New Hampshire, who said the bill
betrayed abolitionist doctrine that freed blacks could be trusted
to carry on for themselves,' 9' radical member Robert C. Schenck
of Ohio put forward his own version. 92 The Schenck version
called for temporary assistance on a race-neutral basis, the lat-
ter to cover the plight of white refugees loyal to the Union who
had to leave the South and who themselves had become landless
and often impoverished. 193 The original conference bill was re-
jected in the Senate as being too paternalistic and the Schenck
Bill was referred to a new conference committee.' 94
As reported out and approved, the new bill did away with
the role of the Freedmen's Bureau as a guardian or representa-
184. Id. at 79-80.
185. Id. at 79.
186. Id. at 81-82.
187. BELZ, supra note 3, at 87.
188. Id. at 85.
189. Id. at 95-96.
190. Id. at 110.
191. Id. at 98.
192. BELZ, supra note 3, at 101.
193. Id. at 101-02.
194. Id. at 103.
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tive of the freedmen, and as an agent for their contracts to plan-
tation owners. 195 Instead, the bill provided emergency aid to the
destitute, and set aside abandoned lands to be rented in forty
acre lots at six percent of their value with a purchase option at
the end of three years. 196
For the freedman to be a full spiritual equal in the civic pol-
ity, it was vital, the Republican Congress decided, that he not
be treated as a ward in any way. Temporary emergency aid was
one thing, and provision for land was not categorically different
from homesteading laws that had applied to whites for genera-
tions. 197 But a semi-permanent welfare agency was out of the
question.198 Equally important to the notion of civic equality was
the provision that the law was to apply to white refugees as
well as to the black freedmen.199
The result of the changes meant that Congress refused to
treat the freed slaves as a welfare class by enforcing a depen-
dency or an apprenticeship on them. Instead, the Bureau would
assist the freedmen and the white refugees in the exercise of the
common law rights that every citizen enjoyed. 200 To that end,
the greatest contribution of the Freedmen's Bureau to the enjoy-
ment of equal rights was the establishment of over 1,000 black
schools in the South.
201
The Schenck Bill also withstood a repudiation by General
Sherman's order in January 1865. Sherman's order set aside
abandoned lands in his zone of occupation stretching from South
Carolina to Florida to .give to freed blacks but to no others; he
forbade whites from even entering the area. 20 2 Some commenta-
tors praised the action as permitting blacks to develop on their
own; however, others saw it as a new form of colonization, treat-
ing blacks as a separate nation instead of as part of our own.
20 3
195. Id. at 104.
196. Id. at 103. The Bureau was to terminate one year after the end of the rebel-
lion. Id. at 103-05.
197. In 1866, Congress passed the Julian's Southern Homestead Act to offer settle-
ment to the abandoned lands in the South, but the law failed in its objective of settling
blacks and refugee whites in that area. FoNER, supra note 5, at 246.
198. BELZ, supra note 3, at 248.
199. Id. at 106, 250.
200. Id. at 372.
201. FONER, supra note 5, at 96-102.
202. BELZ, supra note 3, at 150.
203. Id. at 151.
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For the members of the House and Senate who formulated the
Freedmen's Bureau, there would be no separate and dependent
black nation. There would be no internal colonization. 204
While establishing that the freedman would not be a mem-
ber of a subject class, Congress also believed that it was neces-
sary to formalize his status as a citizen.2 5 Modeled after the
Northwest Ordinance's prohibition of slavery, the resolution for
the Thirteenth Amendment passed the Senate in April of
1864.206 Initially, the resolution failed in the House because of
Democratic opposition, but passed during the January 1865
lame-duck session of the 38th Congress. 2 7 Pressure by the Pres-
ident and Secretary of State Seward had much to do with
swinging the necessary votes. 20 8
For the Republicans, constitutional emancipation validated
the Civil War and established the citizenship of the Negro by
necessary implication. A black-run newspaper in New Orleans
declared, "'We no longer have classes or castes among us. We
are made one people and one nation.'"209 Members of Congress
variously described the Amendment as guaranteeing the black
man his natural rights, or his common law privileges, or his
right of free labor.210 For the radicals, it revivified the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, long a favorite device of the abolition-
ists used to secure the rights of national citizenship, and pro-
vided a boon to white men as well as black.211 The faithful radi-
cals, who believed that citizenship necessarily brought with it
the rights included in the notion of privileges and immunities,
would soon find their equation contested. Even Attorney Gen-
eral Bates, while upholding the idea of equal citizenship for
blacks in 1862, explicitly rejected the theory that citizenship
carried with it any set of defined rights.212 All citizenship did,
said Bates, was provide a relationship of allegiance and protec-
204. Id.
205. LEVINE, supra note 22, at 8.
206. BELZ, supra note 3, at 114-15.
207. Id. at 114.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 116.
210. Id. at 118.
211. BELZ, supra note 3, at 119-20.
212. EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONsTrrUTION AND THE CONGRESS, 1863-
1869, at 8 (1990).
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tion between the individual and the government.213
Yet, the Republican idea that the Amendment at the very
least established citizenship for blacks was itself unacceptable to
many. One Kentucky jurist opined that the Amendment only
freed the slave; it did not make him a citizen.214 Wendell Phil-
lips agreed with criticism that the amendment left the question
of black citizenship ambiguous.216
V. SERFDOM
There was much dying in the Civil War. But in 1865, death
became mythic, for it crashed in upon America at the height of
its euphoria. The year began with the closure of the South's last
major port and Sherman's mobile forces sweeping north from
Savannah. In a few weeks, his forces took Charleston and Co-
lumbia, South Carolina and then pushed north into North Caro-
lina. Philip Sheridan cleared the last of the Confederate forces
from the Shenandoah Valley. On the first of April, Grant broke
the nine month siege of Petersburg; two days later, he took
Richmond; and on April 9, he received Lee's surrender at Appo-
matox. Meanwhile, Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment,
sent it to the states for ratification, and then established the
Freedmen's Bureau. On April 14, Major General Robert Ander-
son raised the United States Flag over Fort Sumter; four years
earlier, he was the commander who had been forced to take it
down. That night, John Wilkes Booth fired the bullet that killed
President Lincoln.
Over the next three weeks, the country plunged into a
mourning that has had no equal before or since. In the midst of
the grief, on April 27, over a thousand emaciated survivors from
Andersonville crowded onto the steamship Sultana on the Mis-
sissippi River for their journey to the North and home.21 6 Mov-
ing up the river, the Sultana's boilers exploded, the ship sank,
and over 1500 of the 2000 soldiers on board perished.217
May brought pallid retribution and the stirrings of a desper-
ate hope. Henry Wirz, the commander of Andersonville, was ar-
213. Id.
214. BELZ, supra note 3, at 118.
215. Id. at 132.
216. MARVEL, supra note 165, at 239.
217. Id.
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rested.218 Booth having perished in a burning barn, the other
conspirators were put on trial. 219 On May 10, the fleeing Presi-
dent of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, was apprehended and
arrested.220 Finally, on May 23 and 24, the city. of Washington
witnessed the grand review of the victorious forces. 221 The first
day, the Army of the Potomac marched smartly in step, still
bearing the marks of the training that the failed General Mc-
Clellan had given them.222 On the following day, the swaggering
easy steps of Sherman's western forces could be seen all down
Pennsylvania Avenue.
22
The capital settled into hope. It hoped for a reunion of the
South, but not immediately. If there was to be no Northern vin-
dictiveness to be visited upon the South, a period of waiting
would at least be seemly. Surely, the visible leaders of the great
bloody rebellion should have no place of public honor or trust.
The capital hoped that the former slaves, assisted by the Freed-
men's Bureau, would find an acceptable place within the nation.
The nation hoped in Andrew Johnson. The radicals hoped he
would punish the leaders of the rebellion and see through the
transition of the black man from slave to citizen. The moderates
hoped that magnanimity from the North would be met by some
level of contrition from the South. The freedmen hoped that the
promises of father Abraham would be kept. And the South
hoped that the new President would not forget his southern and
Democratic roots. Only the South's hopes in the new President
were not to be disappointed. There, though the military accepted
the defeat, the civilian population nursed a bitter resentment.224
The last thing they would be willing to do was to allow their for-
mer slaves any inkling of civic equality.
Johnson had enormous power to exact the necessary conces-
sion from the South to satisfy the Republicans, but he gave eve-
rything away at the beginning and had nothing left to bar-
gain.22 5 Mississippi's response was almost contemptuous to
218. Id. at 241.
219. Id. at 244.
220. Id. at 247.
221. For a vivid narrative of the events of those months in Washington, see MAR-
GARET LEECH, REE ILLE IN WASHINGTON, 1860-1865, at 415-19 (1945).
222. Id. at 417.
223. Id. at 418-19.
224. McKrrncI. supra.note 79, at 156-57.
225. Id. at 206.
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Johnson's later entreaties to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment,
something everyone expected would be a given. 226 And he offered
no resistance when the South suppressed the blacks by reviving
the slave codes in new form. 227 He soon became the South's
champion, and a new civil war on behalf of the equality of the
freedman was fought between the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government.
22
On May 29, 1965, with Congres's out of session, President
Johnson issued a pardon and amnesty for most persons who
fought for the South.229 His plan was to have the voters choose a
constitutional convention that must accept the Thirteenth
Amendment, repudiate the confederate debt, and repeal the or-
dinances of secession.230 But Johnson never made that a formal
requirement, merely communicating privately with those who
would lead the new Southern governments. 231 At first, he did not
even mention enfranchisement of the freedman, and only later
did he privately urge some token concession to the freedmen to
assuage the radical members of Congress. Within a few weeks
President Johnson appointed provisional governors to the South-
ern states. 232 On many points he found resistance in the South,
and, reluctant to stiffen his requirements, he was reduced to
sending letters that were little short of begging.
In August, William L. Sharkey, Johnson's Provisional Gov-
ernor of Mississippi, raised militia units because, he said, the
federal troops were not keeping order and the Negro soldiers in-
flamed the people.233 The Union general in charge, Henry W.
Slocum, forbade the raising of the militias; however, Johnson
sided with the governor and Slocum was directed to rescind his
order.234 Later, when Mississippi delegates met in convention,
they refused to repudiate the confederate debt.235 South Carolina
also reneged on abolishing slavery when its convention declared
that slavery did not exist in the state because of the action of
226. Id. at 200-01.
227. Id. at 204.
228. Id. at 206.
229. McKrrmcK, supra note 79, at 48-49.
230. Id. at 161.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 165-66.
233. Id at 163.
234. McKrrmcK, supra note 79, at 163-65.
235. Id. at 166.
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the Union authorities. 236 In response to presidential hints for
partial black suffrage, the provisional governor, Benjamin F.
Perry declared, "'[t]his is a white man's government, intended
for white men only.' *3 At last Johnson strengthened his resolve
and North Carolina and Georgia agreed with his conditions.M
By the fall of 1865, Johnson was receiving nationwide sup-
port for his plan. True, the Northern press was cautious and
worried, but it feared a break with him.239 Congressmen wrote
to one another, but, being out of session, had no forum within
which to coalesce an opposition. People in the capital fumed
when former federal bureaucrats who had gone over to the
South showed up from Richmond to visit their old offices and
shake hands all around as if the War had been just one big dis-
agreement. The South was effusively grateful to the President,
as delegations of happy whites from the former Confederacy
came to Washington to pay their respects. 240
In the North, however, suspicions were growing daily. The
humiliation of General Slocum in favor of Mississippi was re-
ported fully and must have shocked all Union men who had
served in uniform. 241. Most worrisome was the President's pub-
lished statements that seemed to indicate that he regarded the
radicals in the North as more of a threat to reunion than the ac-
tions of the former Confederacy. 42
Reorganized under their new constitutions, the southern
states elected their legislatures and governors and turned their
attention to the freedmen. Mississippi was gaining attention in
the North. Not only was it the scene of General Slocum's embar-
rassment, but Mississippi was also the one state that resolutely
refused to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment.243 Turning atten-
tion to the freedman, in an address to the legislature published
throughout the North, Governor-elect Humphreys stated that
Mississippi "'is and it shall ever be a government of white
men.' "244 To that end, he proposed a code of laws strictly gov-
236. Id. at 167.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 168.
239. McKrrlwcK, supra note 79, at 170.
240. Id. at 172-73.
241. Id. at 193-94.
242. Id. at 94.
243. Id. at 169.
244. McKrrIcK, supra note 79, at 205.
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erning the Negro class. In his message to the state legislature,
he declared:
"While some of the proposed legislation may seem rigid and strin-
gent to the sickly modern humanitarians, they can never disturb,
retard or embarrass the good and true, useful and faithful of ei-
ther race,. . . while the wayward and vicious, idle and dishonest,
the lawless and reckless, the wicked and improvident, the vaga-
bond and meddler must be smarted, governed, reformed and
guided by higher instincts, minds and morals higher and holier
than theirs. .. ."
Mississippi and South Carolina soon had Black Codes on
the books, and their contents sent waves of shock and outrage
through the North.2 Many in the South were surprised at the
virulence of the Northern reaction. President Johnson had never
hinted that such a course was not to be pursued and some of his
messages even seemed to indicate approval. 247 Over the next few
months and into 1866, every Southern state published a version
of a Black Code, and though they varied, there were common el-
ements in all of them.
Based a good deal on the old slave codes and the laws sup-
pressing freedmen, the purpose of the codes was all too familiar
to the people in the North.m The codes placed blacks in a semi-
permanent servitude on plantations. The device was not dissimi-
lar to the Louisiana experiment by General Banks that had
driven the Congress to eschew any system of apprenticeship in
the Freedmen's Bureau legislation.
Under the Mississippi Code, for example, sheriffs and jus-
tices of the peace were directed to apprentice all black orphans
or minors whose parents were without means of support with
the former owners having first preference. 249 As with slaves,
should the apprentice leave his master's employ, the master was
authorized to pursue and recapture the youngster.250 If the ap-
prentice still refused to return without just cause, he would be
245. I
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DuRING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION: APRIL 15, 1865-JULY 15, 1870, at 29
(1972).
250. Id. at 29-30.
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arrested and imprisoned.251 It was also a criminal offense for
any person to entice an apprentice away from his master.
252
An adult black without employment by January 1866,
blacks "unlawfully assembling together," and white persons as-
sociating with Negroes on the basis of equality would be guilty
of vagrancy and subject to a fine of fifty dollars and ten days
imprisonment if black, and two hundred dollars and six months
imprisonment if white.253 If the black vagrant was unable to pay
the fine within five days, he was to be bound over to an em-
ployer who would pay the fine for him by deducting it from his
wages.254 A poll tax of one dollar a year was assessed, and fail-
ure to pay the tax would be prima facie evidence of vagrancy.
255
Negroes were not allowed to own any property outside of in-
corporated towns and cities, which themselves had the authority
to set the rules and regulations of ownership.256 If a freedman
were to leave his employer before the contract term was up, he
forfeited his wages for the year.257 Freedmen were allowed to
marry and to be competent witnesses in court, but were not al-
lowed to buy or sell liquor, carry arms, be a minister not li-
censed by an organized church, create riots, or make "seditious
speeches, insulting gestures, language, or acts, or assaults on
any person."258
Codes in other states had analogous provisions that were
similarly invidious in their effect.259 For instance, a segment of
South Carolina's code provided:
[Ilt shall be a misdemeanor for any person not authorized to
write or give to a person of color a writing which professes to
show evidence of the right of that person of color to sell any prod-
uct of a farm .
251. 1d at 30.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. MCPHERSON, supra note 249, at 30.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 31.
257. Id
258. Id. at 32.
259. South Carolina and Mississippi had the most stringent codes, while the codes
of North Carolina and Virginia were considered somewhat more liberal in application.
See James B. Browning, The North Carolina Black Code, 15 J. OF NEGRO HIsT. 461, 471-
72 (1930).
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[Also,] no person of color shall pursue or practice the art, trade,
or business of an artisan, mechanic, or shopkeeper, or any other
trade, employment, or business . . . on his own account and for
his own benefit. . . until he shall have obtained a license there-
for from the judge . .260
South Carolina's Black Codes affected Negroes in many dif-
ferent sectors. Marriage was proscribed for an apprentice lack-
ing the permission of his master;261 the unemployed were subject
to imprisonment or hard labor;262 blacks were disallowed to en-
gage in an occupation, other than agriculture, unless a tax of up
to $100 was paid annually:
This license the judge may grant upon petition of the applicant,
and upon being satisfied of his skill and fitness, and of his good
moral character, and upon payment by the applicant to the clerk
of the district court of one hundred dollars if a shopkeeper or ped-
dlar, to be paid annually, and ten dollars if a mechanic, artisan,
or to engage in any other trade, also to be paid annually .... 20
As one might imagine, provisions such as these had the effect of
vitiating any exodus of blacks from the plantation system.
264
The codification of post-war regulations on blacks was also
manifest in North Carolina. With respect to apprentices, one
law apprised that "in the binding out of apprentices of color, the
former masters . . . shall be entitled to have such apprentice
bound to them in preference to other persons."26 5 Portions of this
code also declared that certain blacks were incompetent wit-
nesses and announced that intermarriages between whites and
blacks were void.26 6
Codes in other states were likewise oppressive. Contracts
that blacks were forced to sign incorporated onerous provisions
mandating labor from sunup to sundown, banning entertain-
260. MCPHERSON. supra note 249, at 36.
261. J.G. RANDALL, THE CIviL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 728 (1953).
262. Id.
263. McPHERSON, supra note 249, at 36.
264. See id. Foner suggests that such provisions dealt an especially "severe blow to
the free black community of Charleston and to former slave artisans." FONER, supra note
5, at 200. Furthermore, Alabama, as well as other states, stipulated that a criminal act
would be committed if a black, under contract, was found in the employ of another. See
MCPHERSON, supra note 249, at 34.
265. Browning, supra note 259, at 467.
266. See, e.g., id. at 470.
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ment by blacks on the plantation, and enjoining blacks from
leaving the plantation without the express permission of the
master.267 The Florida Code went so far as to make it a crime to
show disrespect to one's employer and permitted the whipping of
blacks who broke labor contracts while their white counterparts
were only susceptible to civil actions.26 Alabama enacted provi-
sions which limited a black's right to testify in court.269
Louisiana, whose 1866 code was considered "one of the se-
verest anywhere,"270 preempted the potential migration from the
plantation by including family members in contracts signed by
servants. 271 This code institutionalized fines for "disobedience,"
which included "[flailing to obey reasonable orders," "impu-
dence," "swearing," and "indecent language to or in the presence
of the employer his family or agent.272 An 1865 Act pronounced
that "[flor any disobedience a fine of one dollar shall be im-
posed," and went on to signify that "[flor all absence from home
without leave the laborer will be fined at the rate of two dollars
per day."2 73 In addition, idle Negroes could be sent to the work-
house for up to six months.274 If anything undid the whole pur-
pose of the War for the abolitionists, it was the Black Codes.
The reaction by the Union authorities was swift. General
0.0. Howard, Chief of the Freedman's Bureau, suspended most
of the Mississippi Code in November; while General Sickles, oc-
cupying South Carolina, declared that state's code null and void
in December.275 It was a new serfdom, General Sickles declared.
It demonstrated that blacks were to be placed in a position of
spiritual inequality once more within the polity. From that mo-
ment on, according the freedman his status as citizen became
imperative for the radicals.
267. RANDALL, supra note 261, at 728; FONER, supra note 5, at 200.
268. FONER, supra note 5, at 200.
269. RANDALL, supra note 261, at 726.
270. McKrrRlcK, supra note 79, at 422.
271. FONER, supra note 5, at 200.
272. MCPHERSON, supra note 249, at 43.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 43-44.
275. McKrrmcK. supra note 79, at 205.
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Vi. EQUALITY
The 39th Congress had a strong contingent of radical aboli-
tionists sent to Washington by evangelical religious agitation in
the 1865 elections. 276 The representatives expected Johnson to
be loyal to the moral cause of the Civil War, but when the 39th
Congress met for its second session in December, 1865, the
sense of betrayal grew each day.277 First, there was the un-
seemly precipitousness in readmitting the Southern states.
278
The arrogance of the southern conventions in dickering over the
Confederate debt and the end to slavery was infuriating. The
embarrassment of General Slocum embarrassed the North with
him. And finally, when these ex-Confederates thrust the freed-
man back to a state of semi-slavery in their Black Codes, the
Civil War sacrifices were turned upside down. An Illinois Repub-
lican leader declared that the "nominal freedom" of the African
race was "nothing but a mockery."279 The Republicans were in
no welcoming mood to sit with the representatives of these
southern states, who returned with more of an air of triumph
than humility.
Often maintaining an outward equanimity, most Republi-
cans were privately enraged at the southern effrontery in send-
ing into the chamber of the Union so many leaders of the rebel-
lion that had taken so many lives in a cause to destroy the
Union and suppress forever the black man.280 Ready to be
seated were four former Confederate generals, as well as a num-
ber of colonels, former Confederate congressmen and senators,
and Alexander H. Stephens, Vice President of the Confeder-
acy.28 1 These were the men who should not have been pardoned.
These were the men who should have been prohibited from vot-
ing or holding any office. Yet these were the men, the leaders of
treason - in the minds of many Republicans - ready to walk
into the highest council of the land, returning from states al-
ready suppressing the black people anew.
276. HowARD, supra note 47, at 66, 88-89, 101.
277. Id. at 106.
278. Id. at 95.
279. FONER, supra note 5, at 242 (emphasis in original).
280. Id.
281. McPHERSON, supra note 249, at 107-09.
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On the first day of the new session, the two houses pro-
ceeded to establish a Joint Committee on Reconstruction which
would report on the credentials of the newly elected members
from the South. 8 2 Even though the most prominent radical,
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, was kept off the Committee,
and even though other Republicans who did their best to sup-
port Johnson were put on the Committee, the Republican caucus
voted almost unanimously to disapprove the credentials of all
representatives from the South.
283
In early January, 1866, moderate Senator Lyman Trumbull
introduced two bills designed to protect the Negro against the
legal efforts of the South to return him to servitude.284 The first,
an amended version of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, granted the
Bureau adjudicatory authority to assist blacks if state officials
violated their civil rights. 285 The second, the Civil Rights Bill,
declared the freedmen citizens, thereby explicitly protecting
their rights as citizens.
28 6
Volumes continue to be written about the Civil Rights Bill
of 1866 and its relation to the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights. But, the revealing inquiry lay in the passion of
the moment. The Black Codes threatened to destroy the premise
of spiritual and civic equality to which the radicals had devoted
themselves. It would turn the freedman into "a serf, or at any
rate . . . a peon."2 7 In supporting an amendment offered by
John Bingham granting Congress authority to enforce the provi-
sions of the Civil Rights Act, Congressman Ignatius Donnelly of
Minnesota delineated the details of the Black Codes sweeping
through the South: "For one, with the help of Almighty God, I
shall never consent to such cruel injustice. Having voted to give
the negro liberty, I shall vote to give him all things essential to
liberty."28 Then turning to those who asserted that the codes
benefited blacks incapable of fending for themselves, Donnelly
accused: "[W]ith what face can you reproach him with his degra-
282. FONER, supra note 5, at 239.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 243.
285. Id. For the language of the Bill, see MCPHERSON, supra note 249, at 72-74.
286. FONER, supra note 5, at 244.
287. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866) (Statement of Sen. Henry Wil-
son), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 109.
288. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 583 (1866) (Statement of Rep. Donnelly),
reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1, at 135.
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dation at the very moment you are striving to still further de-
grade him?"2 89
Referring specifically to the Louisiana Black Code, Senator
Henry Wilson stated:
We must annul this; we must see to it that the man made
free by the Constitution of the United States, sanctioned by the
voice of the American people, is a freeman indeed; that he can go
where he pleases, work when and for whom he pleases; that he
can sue and be sued; that he can lease and buy and sell and own
property, real and personal; that he can go into the schools and
educate himself and his children; that the rights and guarantees
of the good old common law are his, and that he walks the earth,
proud and erect in the conscious dignity of a free man, who
knows that his cabin; however humble, is protected by the just
and equal laws of his country.29
Also, Senator Trumbull treated as paramount the clear no-
tion of rooted equality between black citizens and white:
In my judgement, persons of African descent, born in the United
States are as much citizens as white persons who are born in the
country..... [Ilt is competent for Congress to declare, under the
Constitution of the United States, who are citizens .... Then
they will be entitled to the rights of citizens. And what are they?
The great fundamental rights set forth in this bill: the right to
acquire property, the right to go and come at pleasure the right
to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit
and dispose of property.291
Illustrating the radically egalitarian effect of his religiously-
based notion, Trumbull ridiculed Senator Garrett Davis's charge
that the Civil Rights Bill offended white persons:
Sir, this bill applies to white men as well as black men. It de-
clares that all persons in the United States shall be entitled to
the same civil rights, the right to the fruit of their own labor, the
right to make contracts, the right to buy and sell, and enjoy lib-
erty and happiness .. 192
289. Id.
290. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1865) (Statement of Sen. Wilson), re-
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The Freedmen's Bureau Bill sailed easily through Congress,
but to the shock of the Republicans, President Johnson vetoed
it. Moreover, his message attacked the Freedmen's Bureau and
every attempt by the Republicans to guarantee protection for
the freedmen. Henceforth, there would be no respite in the bat-
tle between the President and Congress. Although Congress
failed to override Johnson's veto, Congress did overcome his
later veto in the more decisive Civil Rights Bill. When the Civil
Rights Bill reached his desk, every moderate Republican and all
but two of his cabinet members urged him to sign it. Johnson
refused even Secretary of State Seward's advice that, in his veto
message, he should vocalize support for the principle of Negro
citizenship.293
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, and its constitutional anchor-
ing by the Fourteenth Amendment, made explicit what many
Republicans had argued was implicit in emancipation, military
service, and the Thirteenth Amendment. It defined national citi-
zenship by birth and defined those rights that were concomitant
with national citizenship, viz., "to make and enforce contracts; to
sue, be parties, and give evidence in courts; to inherit, lease, or
own, property; and generally to have the full and equal benefit
of all laws for the security of person and property as was en-
joyed by white persons."294 The Act of 1866 directed federal offi-
cials to enforce those provisions against persons acting under
the color of law and the mandated courts to adjudicate such al-
leged violations. To be a citizen was to be equal, one's material
station notwithstanding. Maine's Senator Lot Morrill declared of
the Civil Rights Bill, "[i]t defines him to be a man and only a
man in American politics and in American law; it puts him on
the plane of manhood; it brings him within the pale of the Con-
stitution. That is all it does as a definition, and there it leaves
hiMn.1
295
A few months later, Congress passed the Fourteenth
Amendment to constitutionalize and safeguard those rights
without risk of contradiction; in doing so, Congress reserved the
reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AmMENVM'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 135.
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right to pass further legislation thereby ensuring jurisdiction
over any necessary future clarification.
This article ends here where the drama usually begins: the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 over President Johnson's
veto and its confirmation in the Fourteenth Amendment. Today,
the great debate of the Fourteenth Amendment focuses on how
far it incorporated the provisions of the Bill of Rights or even in-
stantiated unenumerated rights. Although that debate merits
much dialogue, it ought not divert one from the essence of its
impetus.
The first part of Congress's story of the Civil War is already
told at this point. The War had been fought to preserve the
Union, free the slave, declare his citizenship, and protect the
rights that should automatically accompany citizenship. As best
they could, the Republicans attempted to establish the black as
the spiritual equal of the white within the polity. He would no
longer be treated as a subject class by either the South, who
wanted to suppress him, or by some of his champions in the
North, who wanted to lift him up. Professor Herman Belz notes
that this policy followed the advice given throughout the war by
Frederick Douglass about the government's role vis-&-vis the
freedmen: "Do nothing with them. Your doing with them is their
greatest misfortune."296 In that sense, he would be left alone, as
Frederick Douglass had asked, with the federal government's
power at hand to protect him in his rights.297
The second part of Congress's story of the Civil War was
about to be told in the Reconstruction Acts and the Fifteenth
Amendment. The Union preserved, but the Republicans believed
that the source of the treason had to be rooted out by a thor-
ough political reorganization of the South-backed by military
force. In May and July of 1886, Congress witnessed murderous
anti-black riots in Memphis and New Orleans that were abetted
by the police and civic officials.298 This violence convinced Con-
gress that the political authorities in the South would not only
deny blacks their right of citizenship, but also would willingly
participate in their violent victimization.
296. BELZ, supra note 3, at 99.
297. Id.
298. FONER, supra note 5, at 261-264.
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As history shows, the political reorganization of the South
failed. In the next ten years, the Northern armies returned
home, and the old Southern leaders eventually reclaimed power.
Inevitably, terrorism in the South and apathy in the North
forced the blacks into the role of a subject race once more. The
kind of serfdom envisaged by the Black Codes was not as op-
pressive as slavery, but it was close enough. Segregation was
not as invidious as the Black Codes, but it was close enough.
Congress and the federal courts failed to enforce the rights of
the free black population, and in Plessy v. Ferguson,299 Southern
revisionism gained the sanction of the Supreme Court.
Almost unanimously, Americans believe that Plessy v. Fer-
guson violated fundamental fairness, but it also implicates his-
tory itself. Plessy represented a direct perversion of the Republi-
can Congress's efforts to bring the blacks into civic equality with
whites despite opposition from the Southern armies, the execu-
tive branch, much of the Northern population, and the Southern
politicians.
The Supreme Court's validation of segregation in Plessy di-
rectly undermined the moral basis of Republican reconstruction,
as well as the moral justification for the Civil War. The North
had accepted the spiritual equality of the blacks within the pol-
ity without having to concede or agree to their forced material
equality. In fact, the Congress found the two to be in contradic-
tion. Just as a material degradation by the South contradicted
the black person's spiritual equality, so too would the attempt at
legally forced material equality of the black also deny his spiri-
tual kinship with the white. In either case, his became a subject
population.
VII. CONCLUSION
The notion of spiritual equality grew from the abolitionist
movement - the precursor for the political ideology of the radi-
cal Republicans. The radical Republicans did not think one
could achieve the acceptance of spiritual equality through forced
material equality. Their insight should educate us today. When
the coercion of the state forces material equality, the action may
299. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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very well brand the affected groups as unequal in the eyes of
the law and in the enjoyment of equal status in the polity.
It is doubtful whether any cohesive group, whether it be
family, church, club, or nation can maintain an integrity with-
out some shared sense of the sacred. The movement to secular-
ize our state which has grown so vigorously and sometimes ve-
hemently in the last fifty years only divides the nation into
groups of individuals with warring material interests. In knit-
ting together a nation nearly as shattered as Lincoln's was,
George Washington knew that the only basis of unity was, in
the words of a recent book on the first President, "a sacred
union of citizens."
300
It is well for us to reflect on history. Today, some secularists
assert that morality can be achieved without a spiritual or relig-
ious basis. Some regard religion as an enemy of reason and tol-
erance. Yet, it was a religious revival that brought our country
to confront the reality of slavery. It was a theological doctrine
from which we derived our notion of equality in the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments. And in that era, the free-thinkers - the sec-
ularists of the age - were temporizers on the issue. They were
simply of no use in the raising to liberty of three and one-half
million human beings. If it was religion that brought this coun-
try its greatest act of rectification (however incomplete it turned
out to be), then we ought not exile it from political forum today
through historically inaccurate views of the Constitution.
The fact of the religious-based notion of equality should give
us pause in an era of racial preferences. Designed in good faith
to bring black persons into organic equality in the society from
which they were so long excluded, its effect has done something
else. If we define the human person as material - with a cer-
tain skin, with a certain gender, with a certain age, with a cer-
tain appetitive preference - we can only gain equality on mate-
rial terms. But, the very attempt to achieve forced material
equality forces a spiritual division in the polity.
We may never reach a resolution of our longstanding racial
division until we face the most fundamental question of what it
is to be equal. Are we going to be separate spiritually but equal
materially? Or, conversely, are we to be spiritually equal, part
300. See MATTHEW SPALDING & PATRICK J. GARRITY, A SACRED UNION OF CMZENS:
GEORGE WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS AND THE AmERIcAN CHARACTER (1996).
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of the same civic community, albeit with some inevitable degree
of material inequality?
Unless we recognize and acknowledge in political terms, as
the radical Republicans attempted, the radical spiritual equality
that each individual enjoys within the nation, we will inevitably
shatter the consensus that has held this nation together
through two hundred years of stress and conflict.
Diversity is a material and social fact. It should be cele-
brated. But when it is rigidly written into law, it vitiates us as
a people and treats the country's inhabitants as spiritual une-
quals within the polity. We become internally colonized, even as
we work side by side. Such a policy, however well meaning, be-
trays the vision of Washington, the program of the radicals, the
longings of those who were demeaned by chattel slavery, and
the sacrifices of the thousands who fought and died in our two
revolutions.
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